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PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS: THE IMPACT OF
SEC V. DRESSER INDUSTRIES, INC.
Many federal agencies, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, possess the power to issue subpoenas or summonses to aid the
agency in carrying out regulatory functions.' Courts and commentators
have often equated the broad subpoena power of administrative agen2
cies such as the SEC with that of a grand jury. In justifying the breadth
of the SEC's subpoena power, courts note that the SEC must be able to
conduct investigations reasonable free from judicial interference in order
to protect the investing public and to insure the integrity of the financial
markets.' The SEC's freedom to investigate, however, is not absolute,
' See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1976) (subpoena power of FTC); I.R.C. §§ 7602(2), 7604 (summons power of IRS); 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1976) (subpoena power of NLRB); 29 U.S.C. § 657(b)
(1976) (subpoena power of OSHA); 47 U.S.C. § 409(e) (1976) (subpoena power of FCC); 49
U.S.C. § 12(1}(a) (1976) (subpoena power of ICC); 49 U.S.C. § 1354(c) (1976) (subpoena power
of FAA); 49 U.S.C. § 1484 (1976) (subpoena power of CAB).
Both the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34
Act) permit the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue subpoenas or subpoenas duces tecum when the SEC conducts any investigations into past, present or future
violations of the '33 Act and the '34 Act or the rules and regulations promulgated under the
'33 Act and the '34 Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(b), 77t(a), 78u(a), 78u(b) (1976). Both statutes also
allow the SEC to bring an action in federal district court to enjoin any violation uncovered
by the investigation and to disclose evidence gathered by the SEC subpoena to the Attorney General for criminal investigation. Id. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d).
Even though the SEC has the power to issue subpoenas neither the '33 Act nor the '34
Act gives the SEC the power to enforce subpoenas. When the subpoenaed party fails to
comply with the subpoena, the SEC must apply for an enforcement order in a federal court.

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(b), 78u(c) (1976). See generally 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES
FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 1.12[1] (1980 ed.) [hereinafter cited as BLOOMENTHAL].

AND

I See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950) (analogizing
subpoena power of FTC to that of grand jury); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186, 216 (1946) (analogizing subpoena power of Administrator of Wage and Hour
Division to that of grand jury); Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through
Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1312 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Corporate
Crime] (comparing subpoena power of administrative agencies to that of grant jury). Administrative agencies, like grand juries, have broad subpoena power and can issue an enforceable subpoena based on nothing more than mere suspicion or "official curiosity." See
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (FTC subpoena); SEC v. Brigadoon
Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974)
(SEC subpoena). Thus, neither administrative agencies nor grand juries require an actual
case or controversy before issuing a subpoena. The analogy between administrative agencies and grand juries is not perfect, however, because administrative agencies are subject to
more procedural limitations than grand jury supoenas. See generally Wilson & Matz, Obtaining Evidence for FederalEconomic Crime Prosecutions:An Overview and Analysis of
Investigative Methods, 14 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 651, 654-78 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Wilson];
Corporate Crime, supra at 1320-33. See also text accompanying notes 6-17, 99 & 128-30 infra, See, e.g., SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1023-24 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
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and the SEC's subpoena power is subject to various limitations. 4 A
federal appeals court recently examined possible limitations on SEC subpoenas when a criminal investigation stemming from the same conduct
is proceeding concurrently with the SEC investigation.'
The Supreme Court outlined broad limitations surrounding administrative subpoenas in United States v. Powell.' Under Powell,an administrative subpoena need not meet any specific standard or probable
cause but must be sufficiently specific, limited, and relevant party from
unreasonable searches and seizures.' The Powell limitations aply to all
denied, 439 U.S. 1021 (1979); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1052-53
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974).
' See Wilson, supra note 2, at 655-70; text accompanying notes 6-17 infra.
' See SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 529
(1980); text accompanying notes 64-106 infra.
' 379 U.S. 48 (1964). In United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), the Court outlined
four requirements that an administrative subpoena must meet before a court will enforce
the subpoena. First, the agency must show that the investigation to which the subpoena applies has a legitimate purpose. Id. at 57. The legitimate purpose restriction is not onerous.
An SEC investigation has a legitimate purpose if the SEC considers the investigation
necessary to enforce the securities laws, rules or regulations. See SEC v. Arthur Young &
Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1022-24 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979); SEC v.
Brigadon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1052-54 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915
(1974); SEC v. Meek, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,105, at
96,133-34 (W.D. Okla. 1979), aff'd, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) q
97,323 (10th Cir. 1980). The second requirement in Powell is that an agency must show that
the subject matter of the subpoena is relevant to the legitimate purpose of the investigation. 379 U.S. at 57. The relevancy requirement is not strict. The Supreme Court has noted
that an administrative subpoena is enforceable if the material sought is related to the matter under investigation. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652-53 (1950). The
third Powell requirement is that the agency must prove that it does not already possess the
information sought by the subpoena. 379 U.S. at 57-58. Finally, the agency must follow the
applicable administrative procedure in issuing the subpoena. Id. at 58. Under SEC regulations, a member of the Commission, or any other officer designated by the Commission, may
issue an SEC subpoena. 17 C.F.R. § 201.14(b)(1) (1980). The issuing officer may require the
person seeking the subpoena to explain the relevancy of the subpoena. Id. The issuing officer may refuse to issue the subpoena if he finds the subpoena overbroad or burdensome.
Id. The regulations require personal service of the subpoena. Id. § 201.14(b)(3). The method
of service is flexible, and any method that supplies the subpoenaed party with actual notice
prior to the return date of the subpoena is sufficient. Id.
' See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964). See also See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652-53
(1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946); SEC v. Arthur
Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979). The
Supreme Court has suggested that the fourth amendment's ban against unreasonable
searches and seizures applies to a subpoena that compels the production of testimony or
documents. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (order for production of papers and
books may be unreasonable seizure under fourth amendment); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886) (compulsory production of books and papers may constitute
unreasonable search and seizure under fourth amendment). The Supreme Court, however,
has also held that the fourth amendment does not apply to subpoenas duces tecum issued to
corporations to the same extent the amendment applies to actual searches and seizures. See
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agencies, including the SEC, that possess the power to issue subpoenas.'
Thus, under the Powell standards, an SEC subpoena is valid and enforceable if the subpoena is not overbroad and if the subject matter of
the subpoena is relevant to the enforcement of the federal securities
laws, rules and regulations.'
Other constitutional and judicially recognized privileges also limit
the subpoena power of the SEC and other administrative agencies. The
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to administrative subpoenas.10 The privilege, however, is a personal privilege
that preveiits an individual from being compelled to incriminate
himself." Because of the personal nature of the privilege, a corporation
may not assert the privilege to prevent an administrative agency from
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652-53 (corporation's right to privacy noL
equivalent to individual's right to privacy); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. at 205 (corporations not entitled to same protection as individuals). As applied to administrative subpoenas duces tecum, the fourth amendment protects a corporation only
against subpoenas that are overbroad or irrelevant. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. at 202. The subpoenaed party has the burden of proving that the subpoena is
overbroad or irrelevant and thus unreasonable under the fourth amendment. See United
States v. Powell, 379 U.S. at 58 (IRS summons); SEC v. Brigadon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480
F.2d 1047, 1056 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974) (SEC subpoena). See generally 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATIsE §§ 3.05-.06 (1958).
' Although Powell concerned the enforceability of an IRS summons, courts have applied similar standards to SEC subpoenas. See, e.g., SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d
1018, 1023-24 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979) (SEC subpoena must be
specific, relevant to the SEC investigation, and limited in scope); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch
Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1053-56 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974) (SEC subpoena must be reasonable, relevant to SEC investigation, within the SEC's statutory
authority, and not unreasonably burdensome); SEC v. Wall Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371,
1375 (2d Cir. 1970) (SEC must comply with requirements in Powell).
I See SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1071 (1979); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1056 (2d Cir.
1973), eert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974).
,oSee United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950) (fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination applicable to administrative subpoena); McMann v. SEC,
87 F.2d 377, 378-79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937) (fifth amendment privilege applicable to SEC subpoenas). Although the actual language of the fifth amendment refers
only to criminal cases, the Supreme Court has extended the amendment's applicability to
numerous other proceedings. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964)
(White, J., concurring) (amendment applicable to all types of proceedings). See also Quinn v.
United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955) (amendment applicable to congressional investigation); McCarthy v. Arnstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (amendment applicable to civil proceeding). The fifth amendment privilege applies to an SEC investigation or proceeding, but
the subpoenaed party must assert the privilege. If the subpoenaed party testifies or relinquishes documents, courts will consider the privilege waived. See United States v. Buck,
356 F. Supp. 370, 379 (S.D. Tex.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973) (compliance with SEC
subpoena precludes right to assert fifth amendment privilege as to the documents relinquished).
" See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1976); United States v. Couch, 409
U.S. 322, 327-29 (1972).
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procuring the corporation's records. 2 The personal nature of the
privilege also prevents a person from asserting the privilege when the
incriminating evidence is in the hands of a third party. 13 Finally, if a
statute or regulation requires the keeping of books or records, the fifth
amendment privilege will not protect the records from an agency subpoena even if the records are personal in nature. 4
Another important privilege that restricts the enforceability of an
administrative subpoena is the attorney-client privilege. Unlike the privilege against self-incrimination, both corporations and individuals may
assert the attorney-client privilege. 2 The scope of the attorney-client
privilege in the corporate context is still unclear although the Supreme
Court has recently decided that the scope extends further than some
federal courts had previously held. 6 In holding that courts should decide
"2Courts do not consider a corporation to be a "person" within the meaning of the
fifth amendment. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946)
(fifth amendment self-incrimination privilege does not protect corporation or its officers);
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699-701 (1944) (fifth amendment privilege applies only
to private property in the possession of a natural person). See generally W. FLETCHER.
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4671 (rev. perm. ed. 1976); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 128 (2d ed. 1972).

"' In Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), the Supreme Court held that the fifth

amendment privilege against self-incrimination did apply to an IRS summons that sought
records that were in the possession of the taxpayer's accountant. Id. at 329. Relying on the
notion that the fifth amendment privilege is a personal privilege, the Couch Court stressed
that because the important element of personal compulsion was lacking, the taxpayer could
not assert the privilege. Id. The Court, however, refused to make a per se rule against application of the fifth amendment privilege in cases in which a third party possesses the subpoenaed information. Id. at 333. The Supreme Court in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391
(1976), extended the Couch rationale to a situation where the subpoenaed information was in
the possession of the taxpayer's attorney. Id. at 398-99. The Fisher Court reasoned that

because the taxpayer had transferred the documents to his attorney, there was no personal
compulsion on the taxpayer. Id. Thus, the taxpayer could not assert the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Id. See generally K. DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE

§ 3.07 (1976).
" See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 32-35 (1948) (fifth amendment privilege not
applicable to records kept pursuant to administrative regulation).
SEVENTIES

"SSee Diversified Indus. Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 608 (6th Cir. 1978) (en banc)
(noting that privilege applies to corporations); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n,
320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963) (holding attorney-client
privilege applicable to corporations).
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). Before Upjohn, some federal

courts decided the scope of the corporate attorney-client privilege on the basis of the "control group" test, which restricted the privilege to statements made by corporate employees
in a position to control the corporation's actions. See City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). Other

courts decided the scope of the privilege on the basis of the "subject matter" test, which extends the privilege to all employee statements made at the request of corporate superiors
provided the subject matter of the statement is within the employee's scope of employment.
See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd by
an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971). See also 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE I 503(b)[04] (1980). The Upjohn Court attempted to resolve this conflict in
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the scope of the corporate attorney-client privilege on a case-by-case
basis, the Supreme Court failed to establish any specific parameters for
17
the corporate attorney-client privilege.
Despite these protections afforded a person served with an administrative subpoena, problems arise when an agency such as the SEC
issues subpoenas during parallel proceedings. Parallel proceedings occur
when an administrative agency continues to pursue a civil investigation
while the Department of Justice conccurrently pursues a criminal investigation based upon the same. conduct. 8 The problems that accompany parallel proceedings result from the different procedural rules and
constitutional protections governing civil and criminal investigations. 9 In
situations involving parallel proceedings, problems concerning differences between civil and criminal discovery and the application of the
fifth amendment have caused the greatest amount of litigation. 0
Civil discovery rules are broader than the criminal rules." In situathe federal courts by holding that the "control group" test is not the appropriate test for
determining the scope of the corporate attorney-client privilege. 449 U.S. at 392-397. The
Court found the "control group" test overly restrictive and incompatible with the notion of
open communication between a corporation and its attorneys. Id. at 392-93. While the Upjohn Court rejected the "control group" test, the Court did not fully embrace the "subject
matter" test as the definitive test for determining the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege in the corporate context. Id. at 401-02.
'

449 U.S. at 401-02.

, See Mathews, Criminal Prosecution Under the Federal Securities Laws and
Related Statutes: The Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases, 39 GRo. WASH. L.
REv. 901, 964 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Mathews]; Wilson, supra note 2,at 701-02; Corporate Crime, supra note 2,at 1311-12. The increased concern over white collar crime has
resulted in an increased number of criminal prosecutions stemming from investigations by
administrative agencies such as the SEC. See generally Bennett, Representinga Defendant
in Simultaneous Criminal and Administrative Proceedings: A PracticalApproach, 27 AM.
U. L. REv. 381 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bennett].
, See Bennett, supra note 18, at 381-82, 395-98; Wilson, supra note 2, at 702.
See Note, Concurrent Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1277,
1277-78 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ConcurrentProceedings].
The Supreme Court has indicated that federal courts should liberally construe the
discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to allow broad discovery of civil
litigants. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947) (rules nust allow parties to obtain full knowledge of issues and facts). See generally 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.02
(2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as MOORE]. Courts favor expansive civil discovery in order to
promote judicial economy through pre-trial settlements, to prevent unfair surprise at trial, to
prevent perjury, and to preserve crucial testimony for trial. See 4 MOORE, supra, at
26.02[2]. The scope of permissible civil discovery is very liberal, allowing for discovery of all
evidence that is not privileged. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The civil discovery rules allow parties to take depositions without the permission of the court. Id. 26(a), 27. In addition,
evidence inadmissible at trial is discoverable provided that evidence may lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. Id. Any document that contains material within the scope
of Rule 26(b) is freely discoverable. Id. 34(a). See generally 4 MOORE, supra, at 26.55-.61;
ConcurrentProceedings,supra note 20, at 1279-80.
In contrast to the civil discovery rules, the discovery rules in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure are restrictive. See generally 8 MOORE, supra, at 16.02. The criminal
rules allow for depositions only in exceptional circumstances and then only with the permis-
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tions involving SEC parallel proceedings, the Justice Department will
often attempt to circumvent and expand criminal discovery by using the
fruits of an SEC civil subpoena.2 Both the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act)
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) increase the potential
for expanding criminal discovery by expressly providing that the SEC
can turn over any evidence to the Department of Justice for possible
criminal prosecution. 3 Thus, a person who voluntarily complies with an
SEC subpoena risks the use of the information by the Justice Department in a concurrent or subsequent criminal investigation or trial.
Although using civil discovery to expand allowable criminal discovery
could benefit the defendant if the parallel civil proceeding is judicial, in
cases where the parallel civil proceeding is administrative, the Government is the party more likely to benefit.24 The danger of wrongful expansion of the rules of criminal discovery' through an SEC subpoena,
however, does not arise until a grand jury indicts the defendant because
25
the criminal discovery rules do not apply until after indictment.
Using an SEC subpoena to expand criminal discovery is vulnerable
to attack on due process grounds.2 6 Allowing the Justice Department to
obtain evidence through an SEC subpoena would put the defendant at a
strategic disadvantage in at least two ways. A defendant's compliance
with an SEC subpoena may expose possible theories and strategies of
defense to the parallel criminal charge, thus allowing the Justice Departsion of the court. FED. R. GRIM. P. 15(a). In addition, the Government cannot depose the
defendant without the defendant's consent. Id. 15(d). The defendant may discover any
documents or tangible objects within the control of the Government, provided the
documents are material to the defendant's defense, are for use by the Government in its
case in chief, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant. Id. 16(a)(1}(C). The Government may obtain discovery of documents or tangible objects in the possession of the defendant only if the defendant had previously requested discovery of documents in the possession of the Government. Id. 16(b)(1)(A). Rule 17 restricts the discovery of documents in the
possession of third parties. Id. 17. See generally 8 MOORE, supra, at
16.03, 17.02; Concurrent Proceedings, supra note 20, at 1280.
1 See CorporateCrime, supra note 2, at 1335; ConcurrentProceedings,supra note 20,
1282.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d) (1976). See also text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
21 If the parallel civil proceeding is judicial rather than administrative, the defendant
might be able to use the broad civil discovery techniques to obtain information that would
not be discoverable under the criminal rules. In this situation, the defendant could benefit
from the expansion of criminal discovery. See Bennett, supra note 18, at 397; Concurrent
Proceedings,supra note 20, 1282. When the parallel civil proceeding is administrative rather
than judicial, the Government usually benefits from the expansion of criminal discovery
through civil discovery. The defendant does not usually benefit from the expansion in this
situation because the defendant's discovery rights in a civil administrative hearing are not
as broad as in a civil judicial proceeding. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 1, at § 1.12[4]; Concurrent Proceedings,supra note 20, at 1281-82.
" See Corporate Crime, supra note 2, at 1335 (limitations on criminal discovery do not
attach until after indictment). See also text accompanying notes 97-100 infra.
I See Concurrent Proceedings, supra note 20, at 1282-84.
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ment to prepare its case more convincingly." Compliance with the SEC
subpoena would also put the defendant at a disadvantage by allowing
the Government access to more information than the criminal discovery
rules allow.28 Such disadvantages may violate the defendant's right to a
fair and impartial trial guaranteed by the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.
In addition to the possibility of expanding criminal discovery, the
use of SEC subpoenas in parallel proceedings may also infringe upon the
individual defendant's fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination.29 The likelihood of infringing upon a defendant's fifth
amendment privilege becomes especially acute if the SEC does not warn
the defendant that a criminal prosecution is pending." If the subpoenaed
defendant chooses to invoke the privilege in a civil or administrative
proceeding, the SEC could draw an adverse inference from the claim of
privilege and impose sanctions on the defendant." Thus, pressure exists
" See Silver v. McCamey, 221 F.2d 873, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (suggesting that forced
disclosure of a criminal defense may violate due process); United States v. Amrep Corp., 405
F. Supp. 1053, 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (noting that stay of FTC proceeding until after the
parallel criminal proceeding would prevent disclosure of criminal defense). See also Corporate Crime, supra note 2, at 1336; ConcurrentProceedings,supra note 20, at 1283.
, See Corporate Crime, supra note 2, at 1335-36; ConcurrentProceedings,supra note
20, at 1282-84.
See Corporate Crime, supra note 2, at 1333-35; ConcurrentProceedings,supra note
20, at 1278-79. The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a personal
privilege that is not available to a corporation. See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
I An administrative agency should warn the defendant of the possibility of a parallel
criminal prosecution thus allowing the defendant an opportunity to assert the fifth amendment privilege at the administrative investigation. See Corporate Crime, supra note 2, at
1337. Some courts have suggested a warning requirement in SEC parallel proceeding cases.
See, e.g., United States v. Light, 394 F.2d 908, 914 (2d Cir. 1968) (due process not violated if
subpoenaed party made awake of the risks of voluntary disclosure to SEC); United States v.
Bloom, 450 F. Supp. 323, 332 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (no violation of fifth amendment if defendant is
warned, represented by counsel, and not misled by government misrepresentations); United
States v. Rand, 308 F. Supp. 1231, 1233-35 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (violation of fifth amendment if
SEC misleads defendant by promising criminal immunity); United States v. Thayer, 214 F.
Supp. 929, 932 (D. Colo. 1963) (violation of fifth amendment despite warning if SEC misleads
defendant as to the object of the SEC investigation).
1' In certain circumstances, the Supreme Court has approved the propriety of drawing
adverse inferences from a person's claim of fifth amendment privilege. The inference alone
must not be sufficient to support a decision against the person claiming the privilege. See
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316-20 (1976) (approving the drawing of adverse inference from an inmate's silence at a disciplinary hearing). See generally 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 52272 (McNaughton rev. 1961). No court, however, has
specifically held that the SEC may draw an adverse inference from a claim of privilege in an
SEC proceeding. But see Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211, 216 (9th Cir. 1969) (discussing propriety
of adverse inference by trier of fact in SEC proceeding).
SEC sanctions usually cause the defendant some sort of economic or professional harm.
Aside from securing injunctions or referring cases for criminal prosecution, the SEC may
revoke broker/dealer registrations or revoke an attorney's privilege to practice before the
SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (1976) (right to SEC to revoke or suspend a broker or dealer
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for the subpoenaed defendant to comply with the subpoena at the administrative hearing. If, however, the subpoenaed defendant complies
with the subpoena, the defendant risks revealing incriminating evidence
to the SEC, which the Justice Department could use in a parallel
criminal investigation or trail.2 Not only are both alternatives possibly
unconstitutional, but also requiring the defendant to make such a choice
may itself violate due process.3
Another problem that exists when the Justice Department uses SEC
subpoenas to develop a parallel criminal proceeding is pre-indictment
delay." In SEC parallel proceedings, defendants argue that a delay by
the SEC in referring a case to the Justice Department or a delay by the
Justice Department in pursuing an indictment violates a defendant's
right to due process and right to a speedy trial. Although the Supreme
Court has held that the right to a speedy trial does not protect a defendant against pre-indictment delay, defendants may still argue that delay
violates due process. 6
registration); 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (right of SEC to suspend or disbar attorney's practice
before SEC). See generally BLOOMENTHAL. supra note 1, at §§ 1.13-.14. See also text accompanying notes 59-60 infra.
"2 Once a person voluntarily releases records or documents pursuant to an SEC subpoena, the SEC may transmit the records to the Department of Justice. See United States
v. Light, 394 F.2d 908, 914 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Mohler, 254 F. Supp. 581, 584
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d) (1976).
1 Many targets of SEC investigations have claimed that requiring a choice between
risking sanctions by invoking the privilege at an SEC proceeding and revealing incriminating evidence by complying with an SEC subpoena violates due process. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Gilbert, 79 F.R.D. 683, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (defendant claiming the fifth amendment
choice caused by parallel proceedings is unconstitutionally coercive); SEC v. United Brands
Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,357, at 98,775 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(defendant claiming the "Hobson's dilemma" is unconstitutional); SEC v. Vesco, [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,777, at 93,386 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (defendant
claiming fifth amendment choice violates due process clause). Most courts have held that
such a choice does not violate due process. See note 60 infra.
See generally Mathews, supra note 18, at 960-64.
See, e.g., United States v. Rubinson, 543 F.2d 951, 961 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 850 (1976) (defendant claimed Government intentionally delayed for more than two
years in returning indictment); United States v. Churchill, 483 F.2d 268, 271 (1st Cir. 1973)
(defendants in parallel proceeding involving Small Business Administration claimed that
bringing indictment shortly before expiration of statute of limitations violated due process
and speedy trial rights); United States v. Dukow, 453 F.2d 1328, 1330 (3d Cir. 1972) (defendants claimed delay of 55 months violated due process and speedy trial rights); United
States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196, 202 (D.D.C. 1965) (defendants claimed delay of 22 months
between time of SEC referral and indictment violated speedy trial rights). See also note 55
infra.
, See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977) (courts should decide speedy
indictment issue on basis of fifth amendment due process); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S.
307, 313 (1971) (sixth amendment right to speedy trial not applicable in pre-indictment delay
cases because right to speedy trial not available until after indictment or formal accusation);
note 55 infra.
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Despite the problems inherent in parallel proceedings, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Kordel37 held that parallel proceedings are not
per se unconstitutional."8 In Kordel, a case involving Food and Drug Administration parallel proceedings, the Court reasoned that prohibiting
all parallel proceedings would unduly restrict the enforcement of federal
law. 9 The Court, however, noted that parallel proceedings may be unconstitutional or improper when the Government instigates the civil proceeding solely for the purpose of obtaining evidence for a parallel
criminal investigation." The Supreme Court elaborated on the Kordel
limitation in United States v. Donaldson,4 ' holding that federal courts
would enforce Internal Revenue Service (IRS) summonses issued in good
faith and prior to the IRS's recommendation for criminal prosecution." '
The Donaldson decision caused some confusion in the lower federal
courts.4" The Supreme Court subsequently explained the Donaldson
397 U.S. 1 (1970).
Id. at 11-13. Congress has implicitly reaffirmed the validity of parallel proceedings.
In hearings on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Congress approved and encouraged full cooperation between the Department of Justice and the SEC in the investigation
of economic crimes within the SEC's jurisdiction. See S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
12, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4098, 4109; H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977). See also Pickholtz, ParallelProceedings:Guidelines for the Corporate Lawyer, 7 SEc. REGS. L. REv. 99, 111 (1979); text accompanying note 66 infra.
397 U.S. at 10-13. In Kordel, the Justice Department obtained evidence gathered from
a nearly simultaneous civil proceeding arising out of alleged violations of the Food and Drug
Act. Id. at 2-3. The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and held that forcing the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to choose between pursuing a civil or criminal proceeding would unduly restrict enforcement of federal law. Id. at 11-13. The Kordel Court
noted that forcing the FDA to choose between civil and criminal proceedings would not adequately protect the public from the misbranding of drugs. Id. at 11. The Court reasoned that
to require deferral of a civil proceeding until the outcome of a criminal proceeding was unfair to the public. Id. The Kordel Court also felt, however, that requiring the FDA to forego
the right to make a criminal referral if the FDA decided to pursue a civil proceeding was unfair to the FDA. Id.
40 Id. at 11-12. The Kordel Court suggested that parallel proceedings might be improper if the defendant would suffer irreparable harm as a result of the parallel proceedings. Id. at 12. Further, the Court noted that an agency's failure to warn the defendant
of the possibility of a criminal prosecution or to supply the defendant with counsel might
render parallel proceedings improper. Id. See text accompanying note 30 supra,notes 56-60
infra. The notion in Kordel of disallowing an administrative subpoena whose purpose is to
obtain discovery for a simultaneous or future proceeding is a restatement of the Powell
limitation that administrative subpoenas must be relevant to a legitimate administrative investigation. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1967); text accompanying notes 6-9
supra.
"3400 U.S. 517 (1971). Donaldsoninvolved the judicial enforcement of an IRS summons
directed at a person who was not the taxpayer under investigation by the IRS. Id. at 518-19.
Although the IRS had not yet recommended criminal prosecution, the defendant claimed
that the IRS issued the summons to obtain criminal evidence. Id. at 521, 531-32. See also
Wilson, supra note 2, at 670-78 (discussing Donaldson and its ramifications).
42 400 U.S. at 536.
' After Donaldson, lower federal courts had to make two separate determinations
before deciding whether to enforce an administrative subpoena in parallel proceeding situa-
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holding in United States v. LaSalle NationalBank." After stressing that
the legislative history and the statutory language of the Internal
Revenue Code allowed the IRS to use a summons in civil investigations
with the potential for criminal prosecution,45 the LaSalle Court held that
federal courts would not enforce an IRS summons issued after referral
of the case to the Justice Department.46 The Court also ruled that even if
the IRS issued the summons before referral, federal courts would still
examine whether the IRS issued the summons in good faith. In conclusion, the Court noted that an IRS summons would satisfy the good faith
requirement if the summons complied with the limitations set down in
United States v. Powell" and if the IRS had not abandoned the civil tax
suit for the parallel criminal suit. 9 The LaSalle Court relied on two
tions. The courts first had to decide when the recommendation to prosecute occurred. If the
agency issued the subpoena before the recommendation, the courts then had to decide
whether the agency issued the subpoena in good faith. Most courts decided that the recommendation to proceed with a criminal prosecution occurred when the administrative agency
referred the case to the Justice Department and not when an individual agent recommended referral. See, e.g., United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1351 (9th Cir.
1977); United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 1972). But see United
States v. Wall Corp., 475 F.2d 893, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (individual agent's determination that
case should be referred is evidence of bad faith of subpoena). Courts differed, however, on
the interpretation of Donaldson's good faith requirement. Some courts used an objective
test and held that any summons issued before referral was enforceable without having to
examine the good faith issue. See United States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36,
41-42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978). Other courts interpreted bad faith to mean
that courts should not enforce administrative subpoenas issued prior to referral if the
agency issued the subpoena solely to obtain criminal evidence or if an individual agent had
already decided to recommend referral to the Justice Department. See United States v.
Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454, 459-61 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Wall Corp., 475 F.2d at
895-96. See also Corporate Crime, supra note 2, at 1322-23; text accompanying notes 44-52
infra.
" 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
" Id. at 308-11.
46

Id. at 311-12.

" Id. at 313-17.
"s 379 U.S. 48 (1964). See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
4' 437 U.S. at 318. The Supreme Court in LaSalle specifically rejected the circuit
court's position that courts should look to the individual IRS agent's intent to determine if
the IRS issued the summons solely to obtain criminal evidence. 437 U.S. at 316. See United
States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 554 F.2d 302, 308-09 (7th Cir. 1977) (using intent of the IRS
agent conducting the investigation to determine bad faith of summons). The Court felt an inquiry into the individual agent's intent would both frustrate the enforcement of tax laws
and also unnecessarily prolong summons enforcement suits. 437 U.S. at 316. Instead of looking to the individual agent's intent, the LaSalle Court held that the broader intent of the
IRS as an agency would determine whether or not the IRS issued the summons for the purpose of obtaining criminal evidence. Id. Thus, the proper inquiry is whether the IRS as an
agency had decided to refer the case to the Justice Department before issuing the summons. Id. at 316-17. The LaSalle Court added, however, that an inquiry into the individual
agent's motives might still be appropriate to determine if the IRS had issued the summons
in accordance with the Powell limitations. Id. at 316 n.17. The Court concluded by stressing
that the burden of proving that the IRS, as an agency, issued the summons solely to obtain
criminal evidence was a heavy burden for the defendant to carry. Id. at 316. See Corporate
Crime, supra note 2, at 1324-30.
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policy interests to justify these strict limitations on IRS summonses in
parallel proceedings. The first policy interest was to avoid broadening
the criminal discovery rules through IRS summonses." The second was
to avoid infringing upon the role of the grand jury as the principal accusatory body in the federal justice system. 1 The Court reasoned that
the strict limitations on IRS summonses in parallel proceedings would
both preserve these two policy interests and promote cooperation between the IRS and the Justice Department.2
Parallel proceeding cases involving SEC subpoenas are more rare
than IRS cases. Most SEC parallel proceeding cases involve SEC petitions for enforcement of the subpoena, motions to quash the SEC subpoena, motions for protective orders, or motions to stay civil proceedings and discovery.53 Most courts approve parallel proceedings and
enforce the SEC subpoena unless the defendant can show that the SEC
had subpoenaed the defendant in bad faith. 4 The majority of courts do
not accept the argument that parallel proceedings prejudice a
defendant's rights by causing pre-indictment delay or by infringing upon
the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. 5
1 437 U.S. at 312.
51 Id.

Id. at 313.
See Wilson, supra note 2, at 703.
u See United States v. Simon, 373 F.2d 649, 652 (2d Cir.), dismissed as moot sub nom.
Simon v. Wharton, 389 U.S. 425 (1967) (subpoena enforceable unless defendant can show
Government initiated parallel proceeding to wrongfully expand criminal discovery or to infringe upon the defendant's constitutional rights); SEC v. Drucker, [1979 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,821, at 95,281 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (subpoena enforceable unless
defendant can show that SEC and Department of Justice were acting in concert or that SEC
issued subpoena solely to obtain criminal evidence); United States v. Handler, [1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,519, at 94,026 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (defendants failed to prove SEC conducted investigation solely to obtain criminal evidence); SEC v. United
Brands Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,357, at 98,775 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (denying motion to quash SEC subpoena duces tecum since SEC did not bring suit
merely to obtain criminal evidence).
I In denying pre-indictment delay claims, most courts usually rely on two important
Supreme Court cases. In United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), the Supreme Court
held that the sixth amendment speedy trial protection applies only to delay between indictment and trial. Id. at 324-25. The Court acknowledged that the due process clause supplemented the statute of limitations in protecting against prejudice caused by preindictment delay. Id. at 324. The Court noted, however, that a successful due process claim
would require a defendant to show that the delay caused substantial prejudice to the right
to a fair trial or that the delay was an intentional delay used to give the Government a tactical advantage over the defendant. Id. In a later case, the Supreme Court held that preindictment delay for legitimate investigatory purposes does not violate due process even if
the delay impairs the defendant's ability to present a defense. United States v. Lovasco, 431
U.S. 783, 796 (1977). Since the Supreme Court's decisions in Marion and Lovasco, courts
have rarely dismissed indictments in SEC proceedings because of pre-indictment delay. See,
e.g., United States v. King, 560 F.2d 122, 130-31 (2d Cir. 1977) (delay not intended to give
Justice Department tactical advantage and defendant's claim of prejudice too speculative to
amount to substantial prejudice); United States v. Rubinson, 543 F.2d 951, 961 (2d Cir. 1976)
(defendants did not demonstrate improper delay or substantial prejudice); United States v.
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When an individual defendant raises a fifth amendment claim in
parallel proceedings involving the SEC, some courts first consider
whether the SEC warned the defendant that a parallel criminal prosecution was possible." Courts then consider whether the defendant invoked
the privilege in response to the SEC subpoena.57 If the SEC warned the
defendant and the defendant did not invoke the fifth amendment in
response to the subpoena, courts deny the defendant's motion for a stay of
the civil proceeding or for a protective order. 8 Courts therefore force
defendants in SEC parallel proceedings either to invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination at the SEC proceeding or to comply with the
subpoena and risk the introduction of incriminating evidence at a concurrent or subsequent criminal proceeding. The majority of courts,
however, hold that forcing a defendant to choose between invoking the
privilege and complying with the subpoena does not violate due process
unless the defendant can show irreparable harm as a result of making
the choice. 0 Thus, in order to obtain a stay of the civil proceedings or a
Finkelstein, 526 F.2d 517, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 960 (1976) (even if
defendants could prove substantial prejudice, delay of over four years was a proper investigative delay); United States v. Handler, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,519, at 94,022-23 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (defendants' failure to prove substantial prejudice and
improper delay defeats fifth amendment claim). But see United States v. Parrott, 248 F.
Supp. 196, 199-206 (D.D.C. 1965) (pre-Marion case dismissing indictment because Justice
Department's unexplained negligence in pursuing indictment caused substantial prejudice
to defendants).
See, e.g., SEC v. Gilbert, 79 F.R.D. 683, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (U.S. Attorney notified
defendant that he was target of a criminal investigation); Gellis v. Casey, 338 F. Supp. 651,
652 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (SEC notified defendant that Attorney General knew of defendant's
case). See also note 30 supra.
" See, e.g., United States v. Parrott, 425 F.2d 972, 976 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 979 (1971) (noting that civil proceeding did not cause defendants to incriminate
themselves at subsequent criminal proceeding since defendants could have asserted fifth
amendment right at civil proceeding); United States v. Simon, 373 F.2d 649, 652 (2d Cir.
1967), dismissed as moot sub nom. Simon v. Warton, 389 U.S. 425 (1967) (defendants' fifth
amendment rights in parallel proceedings unimpaired because defendants chose not to
assert privilege at civil proceeding).
I See, e.g., United States v. Light, 394 F.2d 908, 914 (2d Cir. 1968) (denying motion to
suppress evidence gathered by SEC when defendant was aware of the risks inherent in
disclosure); United States v. Bloom, 450 F. Supp. 323, 332 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (denying motion to
suppress testimony given to SEC when defendant adequately warned and represented by
counsel); United States v. Simon, 373 F.2d 649, 654 (2d Cir. 1967), dismissed as moot sub
nom. Simon v. Warton, 389 U.S. 425 (1967) (denying motion to stay discovery in parallel civil
proceeding after defendant failed to assert fifth amendment privilege).
5 See notes 31 & 33 supra.
o See, e.g., SEC v. United Brands Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 95,357, at 98,776 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (defendant not entitled to avoid making choice between testifying and invoking the fifth amendment privilege); Gellis v. Casey, 338 F. Supp.
651, 652-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding no violation of due process where a defendant must
choose between testifying and invoking the fifth amendment). In SEC v. Gilbert, 79 F.R.D.
683 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the defendant claimed that asserting the fifth amendment privilege
would cause the trier of fact to make an adverse inference. Id. at 684. The defendant feared
the adverse inference would lead to civil sanctions that would prevent the defendant from
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protective order, the defendant must show either that the SEC instigated the civil proceeding solely to obtain evidence for a criminal proceeding 6' or that the parallel proceeding would cause irreparable harm
to the defendant.
An unresolved issue concerning SEC parallel proceedings is the applicability of the decision in United States v. LaSalle National Bank to
SEC proceedings.6 1 Several courts have suggested that LaSalle applies
to parallel proceedings involving the SEC, 3 but the issue is far from
resolved. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently addressed the applicability of LaSalle to SEC cases
in SEC v. Dresser Industries, Inc."
Dresser arose out of an SEC investigation into several questionable
65
foreign payments made by Dresser Industries, Inc. (Dresser).
Because
Dresser had made the payments prior to the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (the Act),6 the specific provisions and
practicing his profession. Id. The court acknowledged the cases that have held that conditioning the exercise of the fifth amendment on the loss of economic interests was unconstitutional. Id. at 685. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805-08 (1977) (unconstitutional to force defendant either to waive privilege or leave public office); Garrity v.
New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1967) (unconstitutionally coercive to condition exercise of
privilege on the loss of substantial economic interests). The Gilbert court held, however,
that having to choose between asserting the privilege and testifying is not unconstitutional
unless the loss of economic interests flows automatically from the exercise of the privilege.
79 F.R.D. at 685. In SEC v. Vesco, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
93,777 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the court held that forcing a defendant to choose between testifying
and asserting the privilege did violate due process. Id. at 93,387. The court, therefore, allowed civil discovery to continue only if the defendants had immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6002.
Id. The court noted that defendants had made a clear showing that irreparable harm would
result from making the choice. Id.
6, See text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.
'2 See text accompanying notes 44-52 supra.
See SEC v. OKC Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1031, 1038 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (suggesting that
LaSalle's notion of cooperation between Justice Department and IRS applies to SEC and
Justice Department); United States v. Handler, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,519, at 94,026 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (applying LaSalle's notion of bad faith to SEC subpoenas in parallel proceedings). But see Corporate Crime, supra note 2, at 1329 (suggesting
LaSalle inapplicable to SEC parallel proceedings because of real differences in statutory
authority of SEC and IRS).
6 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 529 (1980).
Id. at 1371-72.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, dd-1, dd-2 (Supp. II 1978). Congress adopted the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977 in response to the increased frequency of large corporate payments to
officials of foreign governments. H.R. REP. No. 95-640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1977); S.
REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 11977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4098,
4101. Both houses of Congress expressed concern that many of the corporate payments
were actually bribes that threatened to erode the public's confidence in the integrity of the
free market.. Id. Congress also thought that corporate bribery had an adverse impact on
American foreign policy by reinforcing foreign suspicions that American corporations
sought to infiltrate and corrupt foreign markets. H.R. REP. No. 95-640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
5 (1977).
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 provides that corporate payments of money
or anything of value to foreign government officials or foreign political parties or candidates
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penalties of the Act did not apply. Instead, the SEC investigated
Dresser through the SEC's Voluntary Disclosure Program. 7 The SEC instituted the Voluntary Disclosure Program to help curb the increasing
number of illegal payments by corporations to foreign officials.68 The
Voluntary Disclosure Program allowed corporations to conduct internal
investigations concerning the questionable payments and to disclose the
results to the public and the SEC without the direct involvement of the
SEC. 9 To encourage corporate participation in the program, the SEC
stated that participation greatly diminished the possibility of the SEC's
bringing an enforcement action against the corporation. 0
Dresserinvolved parallel proceedings in which a federal grand jury
and the SEC simultaneously investigated the questionable foreign
payments by Dresser. 1 Dresser appealed the trial court's denial of a moare illegal if made for the purpose of influencing official actions of the foreign government.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, -2 (Supp. II 1978). The Act also requires that corporations keep detailed
records and accounting files to prevent the concealment of questionable payments. Id. §
78m. The Act provides criminal and civil sanctions against violators of the Act. Id. §§
78dd-2(b), -2(c), 78ff(c). See generally Sprow & Benedict, The Foreign CorruptPracticesAct
of 1977: Some PracticalProblems and Suggested Procedures, 1 CORP. L. REV. 357 (1978).
67 628 F.2d 1372.
Prior to passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the SEC had attacked the
problem of questionable foreign payments in two ways. To protect investors, the SEC utilized an enforcement program that entailed bringing injunctive actions against the corporations making the bribes. See Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable and Illegal CorporatePayments and Practice, submitted to the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-6 (Comm. Print 1976),
reprinted in FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 642 (May 19, 1976) [hereinafter cited as SEC
Report.] The SEC injunctive actions charged the corporations with violations of the proxy
solicitation and the antifraud provisions of the '34 Act. Id. The corporations usually consented to the judgment of a permanent injunction against all future questionable payments.
Id. The consent decrees also required that the corporations set up internal review committees to police against future questionable payments. Id. The SEC soon discovered, however,
that the enforcement actions were not sufficient to disclose all the questionable foreign
payments to the investing public. Id. at 6. The SEC, therefore, instigated the Voluntary
Disclosure Program to help expose more of the questionable payments. Id. at 7. See also
Note, Disclosure of Payments to Foreign Government Officials Under the Securities Acts,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1848, 1850-53 (1976); text accompanying notes 69-70 infra.
" The Voluntary Disclosure Program provided that the corporation undertake a
thorough investigation by disinterested persons of the facts relating to the questionable
payments and report the interim findings to the members of the board of directors who
were not involved with the questionable payments. See SEC Report, supra note 68, at 8-9.
At the end of the investigation, the investigative team reported to the full board of directors who ideally would declare a prohibition against further questionable payments and
fraudulent bookkeeping. Id. at 10. Finally, the corporation filed a final report with the SEC.
Id. The most important provision of the program required that the corporation make
available to the SEC all the interim reports and documents. Id at 9 n.8.
70 Id.
at 8 n.7.
, Both the SEC and the Justice Department investigated Dresser Industries, Inc.
(Dresser) for possible questionable payments made to officials of foreign governments. 628
F.2d at 1371. Dresser participated in the SEC's Voluntary Disclosure Program but refused
to grant the SEC staff access to corporate files Id. at 1372. See also text accompanying
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tion to quash an SEC subpoena duces tecum. 2 Dresser sought protection
from the SEC subpoena, claiming that compliance with the subpoena
would wrongfully expand criminal discovery. 7 A panel of the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision with certain
modifications. The panel court modified the district court's enforcement
of the SEC subpoena by prohibiting the SEC from disclosing information
to the Justice Department once the Department impanelled a grand
jury. 4 At a rehearing en banc, the court vacated the panel7 5decision and
affirmed the district court's decision without modification.
The District of Columbia Circuit sitting en banc noted initially that
parallel proceedings are not per se unconstitutional, 78 but recognized
notes 68-70 supra. The SEC consequently issued an order of investigation. 628 F.2d at 1372.
The Justice Department, meanwhile, requested and received files from the SEC and subsequently presented Dresser's case to a grand jury in the District of Columbia. Id. at 1373.
Dresser filed suit in the Southern District of Texas to enjoin any further proceedings
by either the SEC or the Department of Justice. Id. While this suit was pending, both the
District of Columbia grand jury and the SEC subpoenaed relevant documents and materials
from Dresser. 628 F.2d at 1373. After the Texas court dismissed Dresser's suit for an injunction without opinion, the SEC sought enforcement of the SEC subpoena in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. Dresser appealed the Texas court's
dismissal to the Fifth Circuit and subsequently filed a motion to quash the grand jury subpoena in the district court in the District of Columbia. Id. The District of Columbia court
denied Dresser's motion to quash the grand jury subpoena in an unreported order. Id.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia then ordered Dresser to appear
and show cause why the court should not enforce the SEC subpoena. Id. at 1374. Dresser appeared and moved to quash the SEC subpoena and to obtain discovery from the SEC in
order to show the SEC's bad faith in issuing the subpoena. Id. The District of Columbia
court denied Dresser's motion to obtain discovery. Id. The court also denied Dresser's motion to quash the subpoena and entered a final order requiring Dresser to comply with the
subpoena. SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 453 F. Supp. 573, 577 (D.D.C. 1978). After the district
court denied Dresser's application for rehearing, Dresser appealed the decision. 628 F.2d at
1374. See SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,172 (D.C. Cir. 1980); note 75 infra. While the appeal in the District of Columbia Circuit
was pending, the Fifth Circuit considered Dresser's appeal of the Texas court's dismissal of
the suits against the SEC and the Justice Department. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Texas
court's dismissal on the basis that the issues were not ripe. Dresser Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 596 F.2d 1231, 1235-36 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980).
" 628 F.2d at 1374. The district court in Dresserapplied LaSalle to determine that the
SEC subpoena was enforceable. 453 F. Supp. at 575-77.
s 628 F.2d at 1370. See also text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
7' SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
97,172, at 96,476 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The panel court refused to apply LaSalle's strict restrictions to the Dresser facts. Id at 96,474. In justifying the refusal to apply LaSalle, the panel
noted that the SEC was more independent than the IRS and that the public interest required swift civil and criminal enforcement of the securities laws. Id. at 96,474-75,
71 628 F.2d at 1387. See also text accompanying notes 102-06 infra.
7' 628 F.2d at 1374-75. The District of Columbia Circuit relied on the Supreme Court
decision in United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970), in deciding that parallel proceedings
were not per se unconstitutional. Id. See also text accompanying notes 37-40 supra. The
Dresser court, however, noted that federal courts should follow a case by case approach in
deciding whether parallel proceedings violated due process. 628 F.2d at 1375-76. See also
text accompanying notes 21-28 supra, 77-83 infra.
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that circumstances exist when a court should either defer the civil or administrative proceedings, postpone civil discovery, or impose protective
orders in order to protect the rights of the defendant.77 The court noted
that due process rights are endangered when an indicted defendant
faces a civil or administrative proceeding based on the same conduct.78
Because the danger exists, the Dresser court realized that deferral of
the civil proceeding is appropriate when there is potential for infringing
upon the indicted defendant's fifth amendment privilege, expanding
criminal discovery, or forcing the indicted defendant to expose a criminal
defense.79 The D.C. Circuit, however, emphasized that the circumstances
of Dresser did not require deferral of fhe SEC proceeding. 0 The court
reasoned that enforcing the SEC subpoena would not infringe upon any
substantial rights of Dresser. Because the grand jury had not yet indicted Dresser, the court reasoned that the criminal discovery rules
were not in effect, and therefore, compliance with the subpoena could
not wrongfully expand the criminal rules." The court also found that
Dresser's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not
in jeopardy. 2 Finally, the court ruled that Dresser would not necessarily
reveal its criminal defense by complying with the SEC subpoena.83
After holding that deferral of the SEC proceeding was not appropriate in Dresser,the court focused on'Dresser's argument that the
subpoena was unenforceable based on the decision of the Supreme Court
in LaSalle. 4 The Dresser court refused to extend the specific LaSalle
restrictions to the SEC subpoena power.85 Focusing on language in
LaSalle stating that the validity of an administrative subpoena depends
upon whether the subpoena is within the issuing agency's statutory
authority,86 the Dresser court stressed a major difference between the
statutory authority of the SEC and of the IRS. 7 In contrast to the
" 628 F.2d at 1375-76.
78 Id.

' I& at 1376.
81 Id. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
628 F.2d at 1376. A corporation may not assert the privilege against selfincrimination because a corporation is not "a person" within the meaning of the fifth amendment. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
' 628 F.2d at 1376. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
" 628 F.2d at 1377-78. Dresser argued that the SEC referred the case to the Justice
Department when the SEC gave the Justice Department Dresser's files and that LaSalle
prohibits enforcement of administrative subpoenas issued after referral. Id. at 1378. See also
text accompanying notes 44-52 supra. Dresser also argued that even if the transferring of
files were not a referral under LaSalle, initiating a grand jury investigation precluded enforcement of the subpoena. 628 F.2d at 1378. The Dresser court did not reach the merits of
Dresser's arguments because the court found that the strict LaSalle rule did not apply to
SEC cases. Id at 1378-80. See text accompanying notes 85-90 infra.
85 628 F.2d at 1380. See text accompanying notes 44-52 supra.
628 F.2d at 1379-80. See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
, 628 F.2d at 1379-80. See text accompanying note 89 infra.
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LaSalle Court's suggestion that the subpoena power of the IRS ceased
while the parallel criminal case was proceeding,88 the Dresser court
noted that the federal laws authorized the SEC to continue investigations concurrently with criminal investigations.89 Because of the
statutory difference between IRS and SEC authority, the Dresser court
held that enforcement of the SEC subpoena was within the general rule
of LaSalle and thus refused to apply the specific LaSalle restrictions to
the SEC."
Dresser further argued that the court should apply the policy interests underlying the LaSalle decision and refuse to enforce the SEC
subpoena.9' Dresser argued that the policy interests discussed in LaSalle
applied to SEC parallel proceedings to the same extent the interests applied to IRS parallel proceedings." Rejecting this argument, the Dresser
court reasoned that the LaSalle Court discussed policy interests solely
to explain the Court's specific restrictions on IRS summonses.9" Since
the Dresser court had determined that the specific LaSalle restrictions
94
did not apply to the facts of Dresser,
the court saw no reason to discuss
the policy interests that justify the restrictions.95 The court also noted
that the circumstances giving rise to the LaSalle policy interests were
not present in Dresser." In addressing the policy expressed in LaSalle of
avoiding the broadening of the criminal discovery rules, the court noted
that the criminal discovery rules do not apply until indictment.9" Because
the grand jury had not yet indicted Dresser, the D.C. Circuit found that
there was no danger that the Justice Department could expand the
criminal discovery rules through the use of an SEC subpoena.98 The
court noted further that there was no danger of expanding criminal
discovery because the Justice Department could lawfully use a grand
" 628 F.2d at 1379. The Dresser court noted that the IRS could issue summonses only
for the purposes of checking the correctness of a return, making a return for a taxpayer,
determining tax liabilities, and collecting taxes. Id at 1378. See also United States v.
LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 316 n.18 (1978); I.R.C. § 7602.
" 628 F.2d at 1379-80. The Dresser court reasoned that because of the breadth of the
SEC's statutory subpoena power, there was virtually no possibility that the SEC could issue
a subpoena exceeding the statutory authority. Id. See also note 1 supra.
" 628 F.2d at 1378. In further support of the decision not to apply the strict LaSalle
rule, the Dresser court noted that the SEC must be free to pursue civil enforcement proceedings even after the Justice Department has begun a criminal investigation. Id. at 1380.
The court found that the investing public and the financial market would suffer great harm
if the courts required the SEC to defer civil proceedings until the completion of the parallel
criminal proceeding. Id
9' Id at 1379. See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra, 93-100 infra.
628 F.2d at 1380-81.

Id.
" See text accompanying notes 85-90 supra.
9 628 F.2d at 1380-81.
Id at 1381-84.
Id. at 1381. See also text accompanying notes 25 & 81 supra, 99 infra.
628 F.2d at 1381.
93
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jury subpoena to obtain the same information that the Justice Department could obtain from an SEC subpoena.99 The court concluded by
determining that the interest expressed in LaSalle of avoiding infringement on the role of the grand jury did not apply to the facts of Dresser.1"
" Id. Even though many courts and commentators have analogized administrative subpoenas to the grand jury subpoena, grand jury subpoenas are broader than administrative
subpoenas. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) (grand jury may subpoena any documents or testimony the grand jury feels will assist in investigation); Branzburg v. United States, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (grand jury investigative power limited only
by a judge or a claim or privilege); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 283 (1919) (grand
jury investigative powers are not limited by probable outcome of investigation); text accompanying notes 2 supra, 128-30 infra.
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 17, 1980, [1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,562, at 97,947 (D. Conn. 1980), the court approved the
notion that the Justice Department could use a grand jury subpoena to obtain the same information obtained by an earlier SEC subpoena. Although the case involved sequential and
unrelated investigations by the FBI and the SEC rather than parallel investigations, the
defendants in In re Grand Jury[Jan. 17] made arguments similar to the arguments advanced in Dresser.General Dynamics Corp. (GDC) challenged the authority of the SEC to allow
the FBI or the grand jury to make use of material that the SEC had subpoenaed. Id. at
97,945-46. GDC argued that the subpoena power of the SEC was only for use in enforcing
the securities laws and that allowing the FBI and a grand jury to use material gathered by
an SEC subpoena was beyond the SEC's statutory subpoena power. Id GDC also argued
that case law prohibited the SEC from transmitting evidence to a grand jury once a grand
jury investigation begins. Id at 97,946. GDC relied primarily on LaSalle to support this
argument. Id. See text accompanying notes 44-52 supra.
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut rejected GDC's
statutory argument. Id. at 97,946. The court held that the statute giving the SEC subpoena
power plainly provides a mechanism for criminal prosecution of cases initiated by the SEC
and explicitly encourages cooperation between the SEC and the Justice Department. Id.
See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d); notes 1 supra, 101-06 infra. The court also rejected
GDC's interpretation of the case law and instead read the applicable case law as supporting
cooperation between the SEC and the Justice Department. [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH)
97,562, at 97,946. The court, citing LaSalle, stated that inter-agency
cooperation is beneficial as long as an agency does not exceed its statutory authority or
otherwise exhibit bad faith. Id- Because GDC did not show that the SEC issued the subpoena in bad faith or without statutory authority, the court reasoned that the cooperation
between the SEC and the Justice Department was proper and that the grand jury could
properly subpoena materials that the SEC had subpoenaed in an unrelated investigation. Id.
at 97,946-47.
'" 628 F.2d at 1381-84. Because the SEC subpoena requested material already received
by the grand jury, Dresser argued that enforcing the SEC subpoena would effectively
violate grand jury secrecy under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at
1382. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (providing that all matters occurring before grand jury
should remain secret). See also United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6
(1958) (enumerating various reasons for preserving grand jury secrecy). Dresser also argued
that enforcing the SEC subpoena would infringe on grand jury independence. Because the
SEC could selectively disclose material to the grand jury, Dresser argued that the SEC
could prejudice the grand jury against Dresser and thus infringe on the grand jury's independence. 628 F.2d at 1383.
The Dresser court rejected both of Dresser's arguments. Id. at 1384. In deciding that
enforcing the subpoena would not violate Rule 6(e), the court reasoned that complying with
the SEC subpoena would merely disclose the details of Dresser's foreign transactions and
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In closing the discussion on the subpoena's validity, the Dresser
court emphasized that Congress has always supported full cooperation
between the SEC and the Justice Department." ' The court relied on the
congressional desire for cooperation as further support for refusing to
quash the SEC subpoena." 2 The notion of inter-agency cooperation was
also important in the Dresser court's decision to reject the panel court's
modification prohibiting the SEC from disclosing information to the
Justice Department once the Department impanelled a grand jury.0 '
The court found that the panel's restriction was contrary to both Congress' desire for inter-agency cooperation and the express language of
the '33 Act and '34 Act. 0 The D.C. Circuit also rejected the panel's
modification as not supported by case law."0 5 Noting that the applicable
case law held that an administrative subpoena is fully enforceable if the
agency acts in good faith in issuing the subpoena, the court held that
since the SEC had a legitimate non-criminal purpose in conducting the
SEC investigation, the panel's restriction was unnecessary." 6
The Dresser court's refusal to apply the specific restrictions of
0 7
to SEC subpoenas arguably limits the rights of defendants
LaSalle"
who face parallel proceedings involving the SEC and the Justice Department. The D.C. Circuit's position that the policy interests of LaSalle do
not apply to unindicted defendants0 ' further limits the rights of defendants in SEC parallel proceedings. The court's decision severely limits
the unindicted defendant's ability to prevent the Justice Department

would not reveal matters that occurred before the grand jury. Id at 1383. The court also
found that Dresser's fear that selective disclosure by the SEC would infringe on grand jury
independence was too speculative to justify denying enforcement of the subpoena. Id. at
1384.
...628 F.2d 1384-87. See S. REP. No. 114,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprintedin [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws 4098, 4109 (encouraging close cooperation between SEC and the
Justice Department); H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977) (supporting close
relationship between SEC and Justice Department). See also note 38 supra.
,I, 628 F.2d at 1384-87.
103 Id
See also text accompanying note 74 supra.
104 628 F.2d at 1385-86. The Dressercourt reasoned that the panel's modification of the
district court decision directly conflicted with the SEC's statutory authority to supply the
Justice Department with SEC materials. Id. See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d) (1976; note 1
supra.
01 628 F.2d at 1387. The Dressercourt adopted the LaSalle definition of good faith and
found that the SEC acts in good faith if the SEC has a legitimate non-criminal purpose for
the civil investigation. Id. See text accompanying notes 50-52 & 54 supra.
10 628 F.2d at 1387. The Dresser court stated that the panel's modification of the
district court decision was faulty for several reasons. Since none of the parties to the suit
either requested or approved of the modification, the Dressercourt saw no reason to affirm
the modification. Id. at 1385. The court also noted that the panel's modification was improper because the modification would interfere with the effective enforcement of the
securities laws by the SEC and the Department of Justice. Id.
IS7 See text accompanying notes 44-52 supra.
10 See text accompanying notes 91-100 supra.
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from obtaining the fruits of an SEC subpoena." 9 After Dresser,an unindicted defendant may not claim that an SEC subpoena is unenforceable
because of the possibility of improperly broadening criminal discovery. 1 '
Additionally, a defendant in SEC parallel proceedings may not invoke
the strict LaSalle restrictions on administrative subpoenas."' The
Dresser court presumably would afford more protection to the indicted
defendant in SEC parallel proceedings than to the unindicted defendant.
In dicta, the court noted that the strongest case for deferring civil proceedings was when an indicted defendant had to defend concurrently a
civil or administrative proceeding based on the same conduct."' In SEC
parallel proceedings where the grand jury has not returned an indictment, the Dresser court's decision limits the arguments a defendant can
make in response to an SEC subpoena." 3 The unindicted defendant can
argue that the SEC issued the subpoena in bad faith,"' that the parallel
proceedings caused prejudicial pre-indictment delay," 5 or that the proceedings violated the individual defendant's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination." 6
The unindicted defendant, however, is not likely to succeed in terminating the parallel proceeding. Under the LaSalle standard of bad
faith adopted by the Dresser court," 7 the defendant must prove that the
SEC issued the subpoena for the sole purpose of obtaining criminal
evidence and that the SEC had abandoned the civil proceeding for a
criminal prosecution."' The Supreme Court in LaSalle admitted that bad
faith by an administrative agency in issuing a subpoena would be difficult for the defendant to prove." 9 An unindicted defendant is also not
likely to succeed in proving prejudicial pre-indictment delay. The defendant's best means of succeeding on a pre-indictment delay claim is to
show that the Justice Department intentionally delayed submitting the
case to a grand jury in order to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant."' Very few federal courts, however, dismiss indictments on the
109See Note, The ProtectionsAfforded Defendant DuringParallelCivil and Criminal
Proceedings:SEC v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 32 ALA. L. REV. 231, 246-47 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Protections].
1 628 F.2d at 1381. See also text accompanying notes 97-99 supra.
"' 628 F.2d at 1378. See also text accompanying notes 84-90 supra.
110 628 F.2d at 1376. See also text accompanying notes 25 & 80-81 supra.
1 See Protections,supra note 109, at 247-48.
'" See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
110 See text accompanying notes 34-36 & 55 supra.
See text accompanying notes 10-14 & 29-33 supra.
,16
' See note 105 supra.
11,United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 318 (1978). See text accompanying
notes 50-52 supra.
119

437 U.S. at 316.

See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971) (noting that delay caused by
Government to obtain tactical advantage over defendant violates due process). See also
note 55 supra.
12
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basis of pre-indictment delay. 2 ' Even if the defendant could prove an intentional delay by the Justice Department, most courts tend to
characterize the delay as permissive investigative delay.' 2 Finally, a
defendant will most likely fail in proving that SEC parallel proceedings
infringe upon the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination if
the SEC had warned the defendant of the pending criminal investigation, the defendant had counsel at the civil proceeding, and the defendant had the opportunity to claim the privilege at the civil proceeding.'3
Despite the difficulties the Dresser decision causes for unindicted
defendants in SEC parallel proceedings, the decision of the D.C. Circuit
is correct. The Dresser court's decision not to apply LaSalle's strict
limitations to an SEC subpoena is based on real differences between the
statutory authority of the SEC and that of the IRS.'24 The SEC's power
to issue subpoenas in good faith and the court's authority to enforce SEC
subpoenas issued after referral for criminal prosecution but before indictment stem primarily from Congress' grant of wide power to the
SEC." ' The Dressercourt addressed the real basis of the problem when
the court held that obtaining criminal evidence by using the fruits of an
SEC subpoena does not prejudice an unindicted defendant.'26 The rationale of the court was that the funneling of evidence from the SEC to
the Justice Department cannot prejudice the unindicted defendant if the
Justice Department could obtain the same information by using a grand
jury subpoena.'27 Grand jury subpoenas are slightly broader in scope
than administrative subpoenas because a grand jury subpoena is subject
to fewer procedural limitations than an administrative subpoena. 21 8 A
grand jury may subpoena documents or testimony of any witness the
grant jury feels will assist them in an investigation.'29 Thus, the logic of
an unindicted defendant's argument that the transfer of SEC material to
the Justice Department improperly broadens criminal discovery disappears when one considers that the Justice Department could present the

12

See text accompanying notes 34-36 & 55 supra.

" See note 55 supra.
123 See Protections, supra note 109, at 247-48; text accompanying notes 30 & 56-60
supra.The SEC procedures do not require a warning of the possibility of the existence of a
parallel criminal proceeding. See Mathews, supra note 18, at 969; Protections,supra note
109, at 240. Federal courts, however, have begun to look for the presence of SEC warnings
in deciding whether SEC parallel proceedings infringed upon the defendant's fifth amendment privilege. See notes 30 & 56 supra.The SEC should warn the defendant to prevent
jeopardizing the validity of the parallel criminal proceeding. See Mathews, supra note 18, at
969.
' See text accompanying notes 84-90 supra.
12 See note 1 supra.

" 628 F.2d at 1381. See text accompanying notes 91-100 supra.
' 628 F.2d at 1387. See text accompanying notes 97-99 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 2 & 98-99 supra.

"2 See note 99 supra.
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case to a grand jury, request a subpoena, and obtain the same evidence
as the SEC subpoena.
While Dresserarguably reduces the unindicted defendant's rights in
SEC parallel proceedings, the decision in reality does just the opposite.
Because the Dresser court realized that the Justice Department could
demand the same material through a grand jury subpoena, the decision
actually affords the unindicted defendant served with an SEC subpoena
slightly more protection than the defendant would have had if served
with a grand jury subpoena. The defendant acquires the added protection by virtue of the fact that the SEC's subpoena power is slightly less
broad and oppressive than the grand jury's subpoena power. 3 '
DOUGLAS J. CHUMBLEY

"3IThe Dresser court noted that the SEC's subpoena power is not as broad as that of
the grand jury. 628 F.2d at 1381. The court also found that the SEC subpoena procedure offered the defendant more protection than the grand jury subpoena procedure. Id. See also
Corporate Crime, supra note 2, at 1312-13; text accompanying notes 2 & 98-99 supra.

